Can the Afghan Problem be Solved?

by Patrick Seale

Released: 11 Sep 2009

In what is nothing less than a cry of alarm, Germany, France and Britain have called for an international conference on Afghanistan before the end of the year. This initiative reflects the urgency of the situation, and must be applauded.

There is wide recognition in Europe -- and increasingly also in the United States -- that the war against the Taliban is going badly; that Coalition casualties and costs are spiralling; and that restive Western opinion is beginning to demand a timetable for withdrawal.

In spite of some relatively bullish statements from Western leaders, including from the new NATO secretary-general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the truth is that there is not even a glimmer of light at the end of this atrocious tunnel. The war in Afghanistan is a deadly trap which has the potential to inflict serious damage on the armies and economies of the countries waging it, on the future of the NATO alliance, and even on the mandate of U.S. President Barack Obama. It is also inflicting terrible damage on Afghanistan.

The NATO airstrike on 4 September, of two hijacked fuel trucks in the province of Kanduz, which killed over 100 people including many children, may prove to be a turning point in the conflict. It has aroused furious outrage among Afghans, from President Hamid Karzai down to ordinary tribesmen. It points to the gross failings of Western military tactics, as well as to the weakness of the overall military-political strategy.

The paradox is that the West is using essentially military means against the Taliban, even though almost everyone concerned, including President Obama himself, readily admit that there is no purely military solution to the problem. Out of the more than 100,000 Western troops deployed there, 68,000 are American, and more may be called for. The United States has already spent $220bn on the war in Afghanistan since 2001.

So, what is to be done?

Indeed, a key puzzle at the heart of the Afghan conflict is what to do about the Pashtun, a great band of armed, poor yet fiercely independent tribal people, who live in the barren high mountains and isolated valleys which link the south of Afghanistan to the north-west of Pakistan, across the so-called Durand Line, drawn by Britain in the late 19th century.

For readers interested to learn more about the problem posed by this line, there is no better guide than an article by Bijan Omrani, entitled “The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border,” in the July issue of the journal Asian Affairs, published in London.

As Mr Omrani explains, the Pashtuns on both sides of the line have no unified political institutions. They are governed by their simple tribal code, which is Pashtunwali, or the way of the Pashtuns. Melmastia means that hospitality and protection must be given to every guest. Nanawati means that asylum and sanctuary must be given to every fugitive, even to a bitter enemy. Badal is the rule of vendetta, which means that every insult, every theft, every attack on one’s family, every wounding or killing, must be avenged. Settlement of a vendetta can sometimes be reached at a tribal gathering or jirga, by the payment of blood money or the handing over of a daughter to the offended party as a wife or slave.

If a Pashtun host fails to protect his fugitive guest, it is a desperate stain on his honour. A host will allow himself to be killed rather than allow his guest to be captured. This helps to explain the relations between the Pashtun and those members of Al-Qaida who enjoy their protection.

In 1839, the British invaded Afghanistan and put a puppet king on the throne. Their intention was to create a tribal buffer state between themselves and their great rivals, the Russians, who were then advancing into Central Asia. But the Afghan puppet king could not look after himself, and when the British troops left, they were slaughtered.

Between 1857 and 1881, the British launched no fewer than 23 expeditions into the hills – including the Second Afghan War of 1878-80 – to try to tame the tribal people and stop them raiding the populations of the foothills. But they all failed. It was then in 1893 that the British concluded that a formal frontier needed to be established between Afghanistan and British India.

Between 1893 and 1896 a boundary of 1,900 miles was traced -- the Durand Line -- but this was an artificial political boundary cutting through villages, families and tribes. As the line was very porous, allowing people to pass easily back and forth, it became from then on a source of great instability, as it is to this day.

In the 1980s, Pakistan used the tribal areas to launch the Mujahedin against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was where it trained the Taliban, as well as Kashmiri freedom fighters. Pakistan may not have anticipated that the Afghan Taliban would become a fanatical body opposed as much to Kabul as to Islamabad.

The Pashtun tribes are deeply hostile to anything which might affect their cherished way of life. Although poor and backward, they are formidable fighters. In his article, Bijan Omrani quotes some depressing statistics: 57% of people in the tribal areas do not have access to clean water; the literacy rate is 17%, dropping to 3% for women. There are 7,670 people per doctor.

What is required, according to Omrani, is a broad vision for the wider region involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Iran and the states of Central Asia. Neither America, nor Britain, nor any member of the NATO coalition, appears to have such a vision.

Omrani writes: “There needs to be an immediate collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the assistance of regional powers, some means of demilitarisation of the Tribal Areas, and investment on both sides of the line. The creation of a free trade area running from India through Pakistan and Afghanistan to Central Asia should be held as a long-term goal.” But he adds that “it is difficult to see this happening in the near future.” The Taliban will not participate until all foreign forces are expelled from the country.

The international conference on Afghanistan, which the major European powers want to convene before the end of the year, should declare a truce with the Taliban, bring military operations to a halt, and prepare to address the real problems of what is one of the most neglected parts of the world.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.

Copyright © 2009 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 11 September 2009
Word Count: 1,074
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