Crunch Time Approaching in Afghanistan

by Patrick Seale

Released: 28 Sep 2009

U.S. President Barack Obama and other Western leaders have all said repeatedly that there can be no purely military solution to the 8-year war in Afghanistan, a war which is costing the United States $4bn a month, as well as mounting military casualties. Put simply, they seem to agree that a military victory over the Taliban is improbable. Their senior generals echo this view.

If this assessment is correct, the alternative must surely be some sort of political settlement. Yet there seems extraordinary reluctance in Western capitals to head resolutely down this route. The paradox is that the Afghan war is widely recognised as the gravest challenge Obama has to face. Indeed, it is so grave a challenge that it could destroy his presidency.

Instead of devising a political plan to end the war, the current debate is all about how best to conduct the counter-insurgency, what further troop reinforcements may be required, and how to expand the Afghan army from its present strength of 92,000 to nearly a quarter of a million men over the coming years.

General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, is widely reported to be requesting as many as 40,000 more U.S. troops, to add to the 68,000 already there, or on their way. He is also said to be pressing NATO allies to boost their present contribution of 38,000 troops.

In other words, General McChrystal seems to be saying that the present international force of 106,000 should be increased to around 150,000 -- a level approaching that which the Soviet army deployed in Afghanistan in its unsuccessful 9-year war against the Pakistan-backed Islamist Mujahedeen from 1979 to 1989.

It is probably unfair to the general to say that he wants more troops in order to extend the war. A key recommendation of the 66-page report which he submitted to Defence Secretary Robert Gates on 30 August -- subsequently leaked to the Washington Post -- is that NATO’s priority in Afghanistan should be to protect the Afghan population, and not merely to kill or capture Taliban fighters. He is aware that, ‘to win hearts and minds’, the Afghans need protection against the Taliban, but also protection against NATO airstrikes, which have caused many casualties among the civilian population, arousing fierce anti-American feeling.

It would, for example, be interesting to know the motives of Najibullah Zaki, 24, the Afghan driver of a shuttle bus at Denver airport, who was arrested last week and charged with conspiring to make bombs. It would not be surprising if he were seeking to avenge the violence done to his people.

What would a political settlement require?

It would require negotiations, and these in turn would require the proclamation of a truce – a temporary halt to hostilities. In the Pashtun tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the procedure for settling disputes and taking big decisions involving the Pashtun people is to call a Loya Jirga, that is to say a tribal grand council.

If such a council were called in Afghanistan it would have to include warlords as well as leaders of all ethnic groups from across the country -- including President Hamid Karzai’s opponents, such as former foreign minister Abdallah Abdallah, and Taliban representatives as well.

Neighbouring countries -- China, India, Pakistan, Iran and no doubt some Central Asian states -- would also have to be represented. The role of the United States and its NATO allies at the Loya Jirga would be to pledge (a) to withdraw their troops once an Afghan national unity government was formed, and (b) to fund a multi-billion dollar development programme over several years.

None of Afghanistan’s neighbours relish the thought of a Taliban victory – except perhaps for Pakistan, and especially its army and intelligence services, which have a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards the Taliban. In their long contest with India, the Pakistan military have found it useful, even necessary, to train and arm jihadi groups in Afghanistan, and in Pakistan itself.

Only if relations between India and Pakistan were to improve -- and if some deal were struck over Kashmir – might the Pakistan army be persuaded to fight the Islamic extremists in the tribal areas straddling the Durand line. In the meantime, the Pakistan military feel that they need the jihadis as an instrument to use against India and also to make sure that, once the United States leaves Afghanistan, as it must one day, any future Kabul government will be friendly to Islamabad and not to Delhi.

Obama’s hesitation in granting General McChrystal’s request for more troops suggests that he knows instinctively that this is not the way to proceed. There is no military solution to the war. Only a bold political plan which takes account of Afghanistan’s internal diversity as well as the interests of its neighbours can hope to bring this pointless, destructive and unwinnable war to an end.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.

Copyright © 2009 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

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Released: 28 September 2009
Word Count: 808
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